Isaac Newton as a Probabilist

In 1693, Isaac Newton answered a query from Samuel Pepys about a problem involving dice. Newton's analysis is discussed and attention is drawn to an error he made.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/088342306000000312 in the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Karl Pearson's Theoretical Errors and the Advances They Inspired

Karl Pearson played an enormous role in determining the content and organization of statistical research in his day, through his research, his teaching, his establishment of laboratories, and his initiation of a vast publishing program. His technical contributions had initially and continue today to have a profound impact upon the work of both applied and theoretical statisticians, partly through their inadequately acknowledged influence upon Ronald A. Fisher. Particular attention is drawn to two of Pearson's major errors that nonetheless have left a positive and lasting impression upon the statistical world.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/08-STS256 the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

The William Kruskal Legacy: 1919--2005

William Kruskal (Bill) was a distinguished statistician who spent virtually his entire professional career at the University of Chicago, and who had a lasting impact on the Institute of Mathematical Statistics and on the field of statistics more broadly, as well as on many who came in contact with him. Bill passed away last April following an extended illness, and on May 19, 2005, the University of Chicago held a memorial service at which several of Bill's colleagues and collaborators spoke along with members of his family and other friends. This biography and the accompanying commentaries derive in part from brief presentations on that occasion, along with recollections and input from several others. Bill was known personally to most of an older generation of statisticians as an editor and as an intellectual and professional leader. In 1994, Statistical Science published an interview by Sandy Zabell (Vol. 9, 285--303) in which Bill looked back on selected events in his professional life. One of the purposes of the present biography and accompanying commentaries is to reintroduce him to old friends and to introduce him for the first time to new generations of statisticians who never had an opportunity to interact with him and to fall under his influence.Comment: This paper discussed in: [arXiv:0710.5072], [arXiv:0710.5074], [arXiv:0710.5077], [arXiv:0710.5079], [arXiv:0710.5081], [arXiv:0710.5084] and [arXiv:0710.5085]. Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/088342306000000420 the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Scientific progress despite irreproducibility: A seeming paradox

It appears paradoxical that science is producing outstanding new results and theories at a rapid rate at the same time that researchers are identifying serious problems in the practice of science that cause many reports to be irreproducible and invalid. Certainly the practice of science needs to be improved and scientists are now pursuing this goal. However, in this perspective we argue that this seeming paradox is not new, has always been part of the way science works, and likely will remain so. We first introduce the paradox. We then review a wide range of challenges that appear to make scientific success difficult. Next, we describe the factors that make science work-in the past, present, and presumably also in the future. We then suggest that remedies for the present practice of science need to be applied selectively so as not to slow progress, and illustrate with a few examples. We conclude with arguments that communication of science needs to emphasize not just problems but the enormous successes and benefits that science has brought and is now bringing to all elements of modern society.Comment: 3 figure

The Epic Story of Maximum Likelihood

At a superficial level, the idea of maximum likelihood must be prehistoric: early hunters and gatherers may not have used the words ``method of maximum likelihood'' to describe their choice of where and how to hunt and gather, but it is hard to believe they would have been surprised if their method had been described in those terms. It seems a simple, even unassailable idea: Who would rise to argue in favor of a method of minimum likelihood, or even mediocre likelihood? And yet the mathematical history of the topic shows this ``simple idea'' is really anything but simple. Joseph Louis Lagrange, Daniel Bernoulli, Leonard Euler, Pierre Simon Laplace and Carl Friedrich Gauss are only some of those who explored the topic, not always in ways we would sanction today. In this article, that history is reviewed from back well before Fisher to the time of Lucien Le Cam's dissertation. In the process Fisher's unpublished 1930 characterization of conditions for the consistency and efficiency of maximum likelihood estimates is presented, and the mathematical basis of his three proofs discussed. In particular, Fisher's derivation of the information inequality is seen to be derived from his work on the analysis of variance, and his later approach via estimating functions was derived from Euler's Relation for homogeneous functions. The reaction to Fisher's work is reviewed, and some lessons drawn.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/07-STS249 the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Do Development Economists Matter?

SUMMARY If appropriate policies, rather than initial economic conditions, have produced successful development, why are appropriate policies not more widely adopted by developing country governments — or, why has the advice of most development economists not been heeded? The ‘new (neoclassical) political economy’ offers a systematic explanation of why policy?makers behave as they do. Instead of assuming that governments are agencies for promoting the public interest, the new political economy's models endogenise the policy?maker in states characterised variously as predatory (‘the Leviathan state’), as factional, or as bureaucratic. The limitations of these models are addressed, and their relevance to developing countries is questioned. A more eclectic approach to political economy is, therefore, suggested, in which older elements are combined with the new. Such an approach is then applied to the political economy of trade policy. RESUME Les économistes spécialisés dans le domaine du développement sont?ils importants? Si des mesures appropriées, plutôt que des conditions économiques initiales ont produit un développement qui a eu du succès, pourquoi des mesures adéquates ne sont?elles pas adoptées plus largement par les gouvernements des pays en voie de développement. — ou pourquoi le besoin de l'assistance de la plupart des economistes spécialisés dans les problèmes de développement ne s'est?elle pas fait sentir? La nouvelle politique économique (néo?classique) offre une explication systématique expliquant pourquoi ceux qui prennent les décisions se comportent comme ils le font. Au lieu d'assumer que les gouvernements sont des agences pour la promotion de l'intérêt publique, les nouveaux modèles d'économie politique endogénisent ceux qui prennent les décisions, les charactêrisant de prédateurs (‘l’état du Leviathan'), de fonctionel, ou de bureaucratique. Les limitations de ces modèles sont adressés, et leur pertinence concernant les pays en voie de développement sont mis en question. Une approche plus ecclectique à l'economie politique est donc, suggérée, dans laquelle des éléments plus anciens sont associés avec les nouveaux. Une telle approche est ensuite appliquée à l'économie politique du commerce. RESUMEN ¿Importan los economistas del desarrollo? Si el desarrollo exitoso ha sido producido más bien por políticas adecuadas que por condiciones económicas iniciales ¿por qué aquellas no son más ampliamente adoptadas por los gobiernos de los países en desarrollo o por qué no ha sido escuchado el consejo de muchos economistas del desarollo? La “nueva política económica (neoclásica)” ofrece una explicación sistemática del comportamiento de los diseñadores de política. En lugar de suponer que los gobiernos son agencias para promover el interés público, los nuevos modelos de economía política endogenizan el diseño de política en estados caracterizados como predatorios (“el estado Leviathan”), faccionales o burocráticos. Se consideran las limitaciones de estos modelos y se cuestiona su relevancia para los países en desarrollo. En consecuencia, se sugiere un enfoque más ecléctico que combina elementos antiguos con los nuevos aplicándose luego tal enfoque a la política comercial

Regulation and the Evolution of Corporate Boards: Monitoring, Advising or Window Dressing?

An earlier version of this paper was entitled “Deregulation and Board Composition: Evidence on the Value of the Revolving Door.”It is generally agreed that boards are endogenously determined institutions that serve both oversight and advisory roles in a firm. While the oversight role of boards has been extensively studied, relatively few studies have examined the advisory role of corporate boards. We examine the participation of political directors on the boards of natural gas companies between 1930 and 1998. We focus on the expansion of federal regulation of the natural gas industry in 1938 and 1954 and subsequent partial deregulation in 1986. Using data sets covering the periods from 1930 to 1990 and 1978 to 1998, we test whether regulation and deregulation altered the composition of companies' boards as the firms' environment changed. In particular, did regulation cause an increase and deregulation a decrease in the number of political directors on corporate boards? We find evidence that the number of political directors increases as firms shift from market to political competition. Specifically, the regulation of natural gas is associated with an increase in the number of political directors and deregulation is associated with a decrease in the number of political directors on boards